In an oligopoly, firms strategically interact. This implies that their profits are interdependent. The Controllability Principle, therefore, argues that managerial performance should be evaluated based on both own-firm's and rival-firms' profits, as such evaluations (i.e., a form of relative performance evaluation, RPE) lead to efficient strategic interactions. But one firm's profitability is usually affected by random factors that also affect other firms' profitability. These random factors can be filtered out from managers' incentive contracts by using RPE, resulting in efficient risk-sharing in accordance with the Informativeness Principle. Thus, managers' strategic-interaction and risk-sharing incentives are two salient features of RPE. Importantly, however, because they stem from two distinct economic forces (controllable performance and efficient risk-sharing), each can occur in the absence of the other. Consequently, recognizing these two sets of incentives separately in the context of efficient incentive contracts, we show that the real issue concerned with the RPE puzzle is why and how, rather than whether or not, RPE is employed in executive pay. An important implication is that as a firm's price contains information about other firms in an industry due to inter-firm dependencies, its use in executive pay is already a form of RPE.
Introduction
In an oligopoly, firms strategically interact with one another. This implies that their profits are interdependent. 1 The Controllability Principle, therefore, argues that managerial performance should be evaluated based on both own-firm's and rival-firms' profits, 2 as the use of interdependent firms' profits in performance evaluation (i.e., a form of relative performance evaluation, hereafter, RPE) reinforces the strategic interactions among the firms in the oligopoly and in turn the managers' strategic incentives and flexibility. 3 Yet one firm's profitability is usually affected by random factors that also affect the profitability of other firms in the same industry and market, particularly in the case of an oligopoly. These random factors, such as economy-wide and market-wide shocks (often called common risks), may be filtered out from managers' incentive contracts by using RPE. In doing so, RPE helps improve risk sharing between a firm's shareholders and managers, resulting in efficient risk-sharing incentives in accordance with the Informativeness Principle (e.g., Holmstrom 1982; Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983; Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 219) .
Although managers' strategic-interaction and risk-sharing incentives, as two salient features of RPE use in executive pay, can reinforce or offset each other in an oligopoly (Fumas 1992) , each can occur 1 A complementary setting is intra-firm interdependencies of a multi-division organization (see e.g., Baiman and Demski 1980; Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith 1995) . We choose the inter-firm setting, however, to study RPE use in executive pay for two reasons. First, most empirical studies in the literature about the RPE puzzle are based on data from public companies as intra-firm compensation data are generally unavailable. Second , the ability of divisional managers within a firm to sabotage each other and hence destroy the firm as a team when divisional profits are used for RPE purposes (note that Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith 1995 rule out this phenomenon by considering nonnegative spillovers between divisions) is more pronounced than that of firm managers in an oligopoly. For instance, a key reason for the downfall of Enron is arguably its internal corporate culture darkened by its Performance Review Committee, which regularly rated employees on the scale of 1 to 5 and fired those with 5s usually within six months. As a result, Enron's employees were reported to hide trade information from each other. 2 In the paper, we use the Controllability Principle in the traditional sense (no uncertainty), meaning that a manager's performance should be evaluated based on variables that the manager can control, and not on those outside the manager's control. Relying on the Informativeness Principle, however, Antle and Demski (1988) and Demski (1994) argue that managerial performance evaluation should be based on the concept of "conditional" rather than "unconditional" controllability. An intuitive way to understand these principles is that the former refers to the "sensitivity" and the latter refers to the "precision" of performance measures in the sense of Banker and Datar (1989) ; and risks make performance evaluation a two-dimensional rather one-dimensional task.
3 See e.g., Vickers (1985) , Fershtman and Judd (1987) , and Sklivas (1987) ; Dye (1992) , and Gopanlan, Milbourn, and Song (2010) .
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The main results of the paper are four-fold. First, as in Fumas (1992) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) , we show that the optimal linear compensation contract always places positive weight on ownfirm's performance and non-zero weight on rival-firm's performance in a duopoly. This non-zero weight on the rival-firm's performance means that the use of RPE in executive pay by firms in an oligopoly for strategic interactions is always necessary (i.e., RPE depends upon inter-firm interdependencies; see Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith 1995 for a similar result on intra-firm interdependencies). Specifically, because it is positive in a Bertrand-price competition and is negative in a Cournot-quantity competition, its empirical tests will be likely capturing only the overall intermediating effect of both types of competition, providing a first explanation for the RPE puzzle. In the settings of monopoly and perfect competition where strategic incentives (i.e., inter-firm interdependencies) are absent, there is obviously no need for RPE to induce such incentives (as in Jin 2002; Garvey and Milbourn 2003) .
Most importantly, however, we show that this non-zero weight on rival-firm performance is
independent of common risk, regardless of whether the firms compete in Bertrand prices or in Cournot quantities as well as whether the common risk is inherent in the oligopolistic demand (Propositions 1, 1', 2, 2', 4, and 6). This result of ours stands in contrast with that of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) . The intuition is simple: both common risk and firm-specific risk are present in our model, while only common risk is present in theirs. In fact, our result effectively states that common risk and firm-specific risk matter differently to the use of RPE by firms for strategic incentives in an oligopoly, an extension to the insight of Christensen, Feltham, and Wu (2002) and Jin (2002 Second, the use of RPE in executive pay to filter out common risk-that is, a separate objective of RPE to induce strategic interaction in an oligopoly-is unnecessary (Propositions 1 and 1') so long as ~ 4 ~ executives can "undo" the common risk through their personal investment portfolios. The use of RPE for efficient risk-sharing purposes appears to be valuable (Propositions 2 and 2') only to the extent that executives cannot personally remove the common risk from their compensation contracts (see Garvey and Milbourn 2003 for some empirical evidence on RPE use in compensation contracts for younger or/and less wealthy executives). Put differently, the use of RPE in executive pay will serve as a substitute for executives' ability to remove common risk on their own, providing a second explanation for the RPE puzzle. Consequently, the above two results taken together will effectively imply that the real issue concerned with the RPE puzzle is why and how, rather than whether or not, RPE is employed by executive pay. The confusion about the strategic-interaction and risk-sharing incentives' being "conflicting" objectives of RPE might have been a root cause of the RPE puzzle.
Third, we show that whether a firm's net surplus (i.e., profit net of managerial compensation) is influenced by common risk depends on whether the common risk can be removed from the managers' compensation contract (Propositions 3, 3', and 5). The reason for the above relationship is the "stewardship" role, instead of the "valuation" role, of the common risk. When common risk is inseparable from firm-specific risks (note that empirical proxies for both types of risk are inherently noisy and their distinction is usually unclear due to those "gray risks" such as industry-specific and sector-specific shocks and supply-chain-related uncertainties), any use of RPE in executive pay will be unable to remove the common risk completely (see Fischer 1999 , Indjejikian 1999 , and Bertomeu 2010 for other reasons enhancing the efficiency of agency contracts). Therefore, the common risk that remains in the executives' compensation contracts will be part of the "residual risk" born by the executives, influencing the risk premium and in turn the firm's net surplus.
Finally, we show that the use of RPE and its related peer-group selection will jointly affect the firm's net surplus function in equilibrium (Propositions 3, 3', and 6), where "related peer group" refers to the rival firms in the oligopoly that shareholders select as a benchmark for evaluating the firms' managers'
performance (Gibbons and Murphy 1990; Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker 1992; Bannister and Newman 2003; Matsumura and Shin 2006; Albuquerque 2010; Gong, Li, and Shin 2010) . Especially, ~ 5 ~ when common risk is significant relative to a firm's own risk, the firm's shareholders will prefer to select as peer group rivals those firms whose firm-specific risks are highly positively correlated with that of the firm (e.g., representing industry sector and supply-chain risks). Consistent empirical evidence is documented by Gong, Li, and Shin (2010) , who observe that "… firms exhibiting a higher ability to remove common risks are more likely to be chosen as peer groups in RPE." In contrast, when common risk is insignificant relative to a firm's own risk, the firm's shareholders will prefer to select as peer group rivals those firms whose specific risks are highly absolutely correlated with that of the firm. In other words, when examining the joint effect of RPE use and its related peer group upon the firms' profits, it is necessary that firm industry-level or sector-level performance (Gopanlan, Milbourn, and Song 2010; Albuquerque 2010) be partitioned in accordance with the ratio of common risk versus firm-specific risk.
This partition also calls for further examinations on the phenomena of "pay for luck" (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001) and "asymmetric benchmarking in executive compensation" (Garvey and Milbourn 2006; Albuquerque 2010 ).
In particular, suppose that common risk is inherent in the product demand of an oligopoly and that shareholders choose both RPE use and its related peer groups in executive pay simultaneously. Since RPE is always used for strategic interactions in an oligopoly, its related peer groups can be optimally chosen to hedge between the own-firm's and the rival-firms' specific risks (Proposition 6), minimizing the residual risk born by executives for their risk-sharing and effort incentives. That is, we establish the theoretical relation between the firm's net surplus and shareholders' optimal choices of RPE and related peers (Propositions 3 and 6) so as to guide further empirical tests (see empirical evidence in Matsumura and Shin 2006 and Albuquerque 2010), yielding a third and new explanation for the RPE puzzle.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 considers a model setting in which common risk is assumed to be inseparable from firm-specific risks. Specifically, Subsection 2.A presents a simple oligopolistic model, Subsections 2.B and 2.C characterize managers' optimal choices of strategic price and product effort as well as shareholders' optimal choice of linear compensation contracts, respectively, and Subsection 2.D establishes the relation between a firm's net-surplus function and ~ 6 ~ shareholders' optimal choices of RPE-related peer group. Section 3 analyzes the strategic-interaction and risk-sharing incentives of RPE in a model setting in which the common risk (that is assumed to be inherent in the industry demand of an oligopoly) is separable from the firms' specific risks. Section 4 concludes the paper. All proofs are provided in Appendices A and B.
Removing common risk that is inseparable from firm-specific risks

A. Model
For the sake of expositional simplicity, we consider a duopoly in which firms compete in
Bertrand prices in a product market. 5 The ith firm's demand is (for )
where 0 1, and denote the product price of Firms i and j. For simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of the product is zero and the ith firm's profit function is,
The first term is the profit of the product. The second term represents the profit from Manager i's effort, , on the firm's other products, investing and financing projects, and fixed-cost reducing activities, etc. Thus, the manager has two decision variables, denoted by ≡ , . For tractability, we assume these variables are "strategically independent" in the sense of Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) (i.e., the cross-partial derivative of the firm's profit with respect to them is zero).
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The third term represents common risks (e.g., economy-wide and market-wide shocks), denoted by 0. The fourth term is the ith firm's specific risk, denoted by 0. This explicit formulation of 
where 0, 1 1, 0 (for , , and ), and ≡ ̃ ̃ . Note that in the linear contract, there are two explicit uses of RPE. The first use of RPE comes from the performance measure in the second term, (Fumas 1992, p. 476) , which provides strategic incentives for the manager to compete in the oligopoly (see Joh 1999 for a discussion on RPE and product market collusion). The 7 We assume that the risk structure for firm-specific risks is "additive" with respect to the manager's decisions so as to be consistent with our use of linear compensation contracts. If, instead, it is assumed to be "multiplicative," other forms of contracts would then need to be considered (see, e.g., Feltham and Wu 2001 consider that managerial effort affects both the "sensitivity" and "precision" of performance measures).
second use of RPE is from the information signal about the common risk in the third term: ≡ ̃ ̃ .
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We choose to be a noisy representation of the common risk as we assume that the common risk is inseparable from firm-specific risks (but if ̃ , our results do not change, anyway; we will consider this in next section). Note, is analogous to the "luck" term used by Garvey and Milbourn (2006) and can be interpreted as the common-risk signal on returns to the industry, oil prices, and exchange rates (in particular, peer-group selections in empirical studies are not limited to the same industries).
Motivated by the proxy challenge faced by empirical investigations that any information signal about common risks is inherently noisy, we assume that the common and firm-specific components of risk are inseparable (we relax this assumption in the next section). By "inseparable" we mean that both the common and firm-specific components of risk can only be observed together and therefore employed as one measure (not separately) for contracting purposes.
The contract can be expressed as ≡ , , , and the coefficients are, (i) represents the "fixed salary" component of Manager i's compensation contract, and reflects the manager's value from the labor market;
(ii) is interpreted as the "effort incentive" rate (which is often referred to as the "pay-for-performance sensitivity" in the archival empirical studies on executive pay) on the own-firm's profit; (iii) represents the "strategic incentive" rate on the rival-firm's profit, though it is the ratio of the weights on the rival-firm's and the own-firm's profits; 9 and (iv) is the "risk-sharing incentive" rate on the information signal about the common risk, helping filter out the common risk inherent in the contract. 10 To 8 We do not use the rival-firm's profit here as RPE to filter out the common risk, because the rival-firm's profit is influenced by both the common risk and the strategic interaction of managers in the oligopoly.
9 Alternatively, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a, Equation (5)) considered the following for of linear contract, , and showed that only the ratio, ≡ / , matters (see their Equations (14) and (28)). Further, we show that, in our Propositions 1 and 4, is independent of the common risk, implying that actually provides the manager with strategic incentives (i.e., the Controllability Principle applies), rather than filters out the common risk (i.e., the Informativeness Principle applies). This is our main result of the paper. Obviously, the optimal linear contract will depend on the rival-firm's profit (i.e., is non-zero). Thus, the use of RPE in executive pay to provide strategic incentives (Fumas 1992 ) might have been confused with the use of RPE in executive pay to filter out common risks (see below). Our goal in this paper is to formally clarify this confusion. emphasize the "filtering" effect, we use a negative sign, rather than a positive sign, on the common-risk information signal. Hereafter, we refer to as an RPE use in executive pay to filter out common risks.
Managers cannot personally go short in their own-firm's profit, so they are precluded from "undoing" their own firm's specific risk that is inherent in their compensation contracts. But they can personally invest (or go short) in information signals about common risks (see e.g., Fischer 1999; Christensen, Feltham, and Wu 2002; Jin 2002; Garvey and Milbourn 2003) . As the common component of risk is inseparable from the firm-specific component of risk, the manager's personal investment in the common risk information will not only help filter out the common risk, but may also help hedge against the firm-specific risks. In particular, this is true if the firm-specific risk of the rival firm is negatively correlated with that of the manager's own-firm's specific risk.
11 The ability to hedge is limited, if the firms' firm-specific risks are independent of each other.
Let represent the amount that Manager i borrows to invest in the common-risk information signal (see Garvey and Milbourn, 2003 
Naturally, Manager i's decision variables are now expanded to ≡ , , . He will then make his decisions in order to maximize his expected utility (where CE represents certainty equivalent):
where
E , and (5c)
The first-order conditions with respect to Manager i's decisions, , are as follows:
, 0 ⇔ 2 1 0, and
Solving (6c) yields 1 . Rewriting (6b) yields
That is, Lemma 1: Assume that the managers can personally trade on the common-risk information. Then their optimal choice variables (which we denote by †) for productive effort, strategic price, and personal investment are given as follows:
.
Inspecting the managers' optimal choice variables lends supports to our interpretations of these coefficients of the linear compensation contract (see the paragraph following Equation (2) above).
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Specifically, Equations (7a) and (7b) show that, while the strategic incentive rate ( ) directly affects the optimal strategic price but not the optimal effort level (for more details see Part (a) of Remark 1 below), the effort incentive rate ( ) directly influences the optimal effort level but not the optimal strategic price (see Part (b) of Remark 1). Intuitively, the strategic incentive helps motivate managers to interact strategically in the oligopoly, and the effort incentive helps induce managers to exert productive effort.
Equations (7a) and (7b) also show that the risk-sharing incentive rate ( ) affects neither the optimal effort level nor the optimal strategic price. It does, however, affect the optimal personal investment in Equation (7c). In particular, the risk-sharing incentive rate is precisely offsetting the optimal personal investment (note, the sign on is designed to be negative; more details will be provided in Part (c) of
Remark 1 below).
To better explain the offsetting effects between the risk-sharing incentive and personal investment, we re-express Equation (7c) as follows:
1 .
The first term inside the curly bracket represents the common risk from the compensation contract,
1
, that is not removed by the choice of in the contract to filter out the common risk. Similarly, the expression inside second term of the bracket is the rival-firm's specific risk from the compensation contract, , that is not removed by the choice of in the contract. Because the common risk is inseparable from the firm-specific risk (we will relax this assumption in the next section), the manager must choose to remove a "weighted" average of the common risk and the firm-specific risk from his compensation contract, and the weights are simply the respective ratios with respect to the total risk:
and .
Let's consider two special cases so as to shed some lights on this RPE use in executive pay to filter out common risks. The first one is 1. From Equation (7c), we get that 1 , which means that the total risk will be entirely removed from the compensation contract. This is not ~ 12 ~ surprising, of course, because the firm-specific risk is absent in this special case. The other special case is 0. From Equation (7c), we get,
It can be shown that this will actually help minimize the total risk and the risk premium so as to maximize the firm's net surplus to shareholders (see Appendix A for the proof, in particular, Equations (A.5) and (A.6)). In other words, 0 means that it is unnecessary for managers to personally trade on the common-risk information because the RPE use in the contracts has already filtered out the common risk (see more details in Proposition 2 below).
Remark 1: Assume the managers can personally trade on the common risk information.
(a) The optimal effort level is increasing in the effort incentive rate, and is independent of both the strategic incentive rate and the risk-sharing incentive rate, i.e., 0, 0, and 0.
(b) The optimal strategic price is increasing in the strategic incentive rate, and is independent of both the effort incentive rate and the risk-sharing incentive rate, i.e., 0, ∆ 0, and 0.
(c) The impact of the effort incentive rate on the manager's personal investment level is ambiguous, but the optimal level of the manager's personal investment is decreasing in the strategic incentive rate and is offset exactly by the risk-sharing incentive rate (note, the sign on in the compensation contract is negative), i.e., , 0, and 1.
Further, the effort incentive rate will interact with both the strategic incentive rate and the risk factors (i.e., , , and ) to influence the manager's personal investment, but the strategic incentive rate and the risk factors have no interactive effect on the manager's personal investment level. Formally (for y , , and ),
~ 13 ~ Given these relationships outlined in Remark 1 above, we can now discuss how risk factors (such as the common risk, the firm-specific risk, and the correlation between firm-specific risks) affect the managers' optimal decisions. As is discussed in detail in Remark 2 below, the most intriguing observation is that the risk factors affect neither the managers' optimal effort decision nor the managers' optimal price decision. That is, given the linear compensation contracts, managers will make their production decisions and strategic choices independent of risks, despite the fact that they are risk averse. These risk factors do directly influence the managers' personal investment decisions.
Remark 2: Assume the managers can personally trade on the common risk information.
(a) The managers' optimal effort and strategic decisions are independent of risks, i.e., for , , and , 0, and 0.
(b) The managers' optimal personal investment is independent of the risk factors if, and only if, 1. That is, 0 if, and only if, 1.
In general (when 1), the managers' optimal personal investment is decreasing in common risk and the correlation between firm-specific risks; but whether it increases or decreases in firm-specific risk depends on whether is negative or positive, i.e.,
The intuition behind the results in the second half of Remark 2, Part (b), is as follows. Given their compensation contracts, risk-averse managers will decrease their personal investment as common risk increases, as the firm-specific risk correlation increases, or as firm-specific risk increases when 0.
However, they will increase their personal investment as firm-specific risk increases when 0, because 0 allows managers to hedge firm-specific risks.
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C. Shareholders' optimal choice of linear compensation contracts
Given managers' best responses to the compensation contracts, shareholders will optimally choose the coefficients of the linear compensation contracts: ≡ , , , . That is, the problem of Firm ′ shareholders, who are assumed to be risk neutral, is characterized as follows:
∈ argmax E u , | .
The fixed compensation component ( ) will be optimally set so as to make the participation constraint binding in equilibrium, i.e., CE , , where represents the reservation certainty equivalent. Noticing that CE , ≡ E Var from (5b), we re-express this binding constraint above as follows:
Note that represents the risk premium paid to the manager. This premium is calculated by substituting in Equation (7c) into Var in Equation (5d). In addition, the manager's expected compensation and expected wealth are assumed to be equal (partially due to the no-wealth effect of managers' negative exponential utility function): E ̃ E . Thus, shareholders' objective function (which we denote by †) is expressed as
where ≡ ∆ , ≡ 2 1 , and ≡ 2 1 1 .
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Obviously, is independent of and , and is independent of and . Therefore, the first-order conditions with respect to , , and , are, respectively, 
The third equality above directly follows from the substitutions of and 2 ∆ 1 , and the last equality follows from some algebraic manipulations. Hence, the following proposition becomes straightforward.
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Proposition 1: Assume the managers can personally trade on the common risk information.
(a) It is unnecessary to use RPE in compensation contracts to filter out common risk, i.e., λ is a free choice (or any value would be an optimal choice). 12 We consider the coefficients ( , , and ) of the incentive contract to be simultaneously determined (as in Aggarwal and Samwick 1999a) . Though the model of Fumas (1992) is more general than ours, it only characterizes the contract coefficients as being sequentially determined. That is, the first-order condition of is used to solve for the optimal , which is then treated as a function of (Fumas 1992, p. 484) . A key implication of this sequential decision-making over and is that the effort/risk-sharing and strategic-interaction incentives are assumed to be interdependent by default. In contrast, we assume that shareholders optimally determine and simultaneously, and our result shows that the common risk does not affect (see Part (b) of Propositions 1 and 4). This implies that the use of RPE in executive pay to provide the strategic-interaction incentive actually is a separate issue from the use of RPE in executive pay to filter out the common risk-the key insight of our paper.
~ 16 ~ (b) It is always necessary to use RPE in compensation contracts to provide strategic incentives, and the optimal strategic incentive rate is independent of the risk factors.
14 Specifically, for , , and , 0, and 0.
(c) The optimal effort incentive rate is .
This rate is constant and equal to one if and only if 1. If, instead, 1, this rate will be decreasing in the manager's risk aversion, common risk, and firm-specific risk, but whether it increases or decreases in the firm-specific risk correlation depends on whether the correlation is larger or smaller than the negative ratio between the common and firm-specific risks. Specifically, 14 Note that 0 if, and only if, 0, which is ruled out in the oligopoly, of course.
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Second, the use of RPE in executive pay to induce strategic incentives due to inter-firm interdependencies in an oligopoly is always necessary: 0. More specifically, because is positive in a Bertrand-price competition and is negative in a Cournot-quantity competition (see Part (b) of Proposition 1' in Appendix B), the offsetting effect from the two types of product-market competition provides another explanation for prior studies' limited success in finding evidence of RPE use in executive pay. As strategic incentives or inter-firm dependencies are absent in the settings of monopoly and perfect competition, there is no need for RPE use in executive pay to provide strategic incentives.
Further, because the optimal strategic incentive rate is independent of common risks, the use of RPE in executive pay for strategic incentives is actually a separate issue from the use of RPE in executive pay to filter out common risks-which arises from efficient risk premium consideration (see the discussions for the result of Part (a) above). Such a separation between the strategic and risk-sharing incentives of RPE use in executive pay will shed new light on the RPE puzzle and improve the optimal design of executive compensation contracts. In particular, risk-averse managers require a risk premium for bearing firm-specific risks, but not for bearing common risks, because they can remove the latter through their personal investments. Therefore, when designing executive pay, shareholders can focus on the RPE use for strategic incentives and ignore the risk premium associated with common risks (unless it is prohibitively costly for executives to remove these common risks on their own; see Garvey and Milbourn 2003) .
Finally, the effort incentive rate ( ) or the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the optimal linear compensation contract will depend on the firm-specific risk that cannot be removed by the manager's personal investment. This risk that the manager cannot remove through personal investment may be referred to as residual risk, which can be alternatively expressed as 1 1 . The reason that common risk remains in the calculation of this residual risk term is that it is inseparable from firmspecific risk. Managers thus choose their personal investment to minimize the total risk that they must bear; specifically, they choose as given in Equation (7c) to minimize Var in Equation (5d), which ~ 18 ~ is characterized by the first-order condition in Equation (6c). If 1 (similar to the model of Aggarwal and Samwick 1999a, in which firm-specific risks are absent), the residual risk will vanish. This means that risk-averse managers will bear no risks because they can remove all risks through their personal investment, 1 . Thus, they will strategically interact in the oligopoly as if they were risk neutral.
On the other hand, if 1, then the residual risk will be increasing in both common risk and firm-specific risk. Consequently, the pay-for-performance sensitivity ( ) of the optimal linear contract will decrease in both types of risk (see Equation (16a)). While the negative relationship between pay-forperformance sensitivity and firm-specific risk is standard in the agency literature, the finding of a negative relation between pay-for-performance sensitivity and common risk is new (provided that common risk is being filtered out by an explicit use of RPE and/or by managers' personal investment portfolios). In other words, common risk (which is inseparable from firm-specific risk) may be removed for strategic- So far, we have maintained the assumption that managers can personally trade on the common risk information. In such a setting, the incentive rates of the linear contract will exactly fulfill their "separate" roles, and it is intuitive to see that an explicit use of RPE in executive pay to filter out common risks is unnecessary (note that an explicit RPE use in executive pay to provide strategic incentives in an oligopoly is always necessary). However, if managers are prohibited from personally trading on the common-risk information, or if they have limited ability to remove the common component of risk through their personal investment (Garvey and Milbourn 2003) , shareholders can explicitly include the common-risk information in the compensation contracts so as to help filter out the common risk. In this case, the optimal risk-sharing incentive rate ( ) will no longer be a free variable; rather, it will be affected by the risk factors as well as by the "degree" of competition in the oligopoly (see Appendix A for the proof).
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Proposition 2: Assume that the common risk information is contractible by shareholders, but is not tradable by managers.
(a) The optimal effort incentive rate and the optimal strategic incentive rate are equal to those given in Equations (14) and (15), i.e., , and .
(b) The optimal risk-sharing incentive rate is λ .
This rate increases in common risk and in the degree of competition in the oligopolistic market (for 1), that is, 0, and 0.
Part (a) of Proposition 2 shows that the optimal effort incentive rate and the optimal strategic incentive rate remain unchanged from those in Proposition 1. In contrast, Part (b) shows that the risksharing incentive rate differs from that in Proposition 1. Taken together, the two propositions therefore imply that the RPE use in compensation contracts to filter out common risks is only valuable if executives cannot undo the common component of risk through their personal investments (see Garvey and Milbourn 2003 for empirical evidence on the use of RPE in compensation contracts for younger executives and for executives with less financial wealth). The RPE use in executive pay to provide strategic incentives in an oligopoly is always necessary and independent of common risks.
D. Firm's net surplus and shareholders' choice of RPE-related peer groups
In the previous subsection, we characterized the optimal linear compensation contract for any given (the correction between the firms' specific risks). Since is interpreted as the choice variable of RPE-related peer groups, we now examine the firm's optimal net surplus as a function of . Substituting the optimal linear contract (i.e., or ; see Propositions 1 and 2) into managers' optimal decisions (i.e., ; see Lemma 1), we can compute the equilibrium strategic price, revenue function, and risk premium (which we denote by *), as a function of , as follows:
~ 20 ~ * , * ≡ * * *
, and * ≡ 1 .
Note, * and * are derived from straightforward algebraic manipulations, and * is just another expression for Equation (15). The effort-incentive rate ( -also known as the "incentive power" or "pay-for-performance sensitivity"-is characterized as a function of (see Equation (16b)). Hence, applying the above expressions to the firm's objective function Equation (12), we can compute the firm's optimal net surplus (which we denote by *) in Equation (18) below, a function of only through .
Proposition 3: Assume the common risk information is either contractible by shareholders or personally tradable by managers. Then, for any given , the firm's optimal net-surplus is
It decreases in the manager's risk aversion, common risk, and firm-specific risk, i.e., 
Further, whether it increases or decreases in the correlation between firm-specific risks depends on whether the correlation is larger or smaller than the negative ratio between the common and firm-specific risks. Specifically, (19b) 15 We have effectively treated shareholders' RPE-related peer group selection as a sequential decision after shareholders have chosen the optimal linear compensation contract. Alternatively, shareholders may simultaneously choose the RPE-related peer group and the optimal linear incentive contract. That is, in addition to those existing first-order conditions in Equations (13a), (13b), and (13c), we need to add another first-order condition with respect to . Since the objective function in Equation (12) is convex in , the optimal solution of cannot be interior (which is identical to what is obtained in the sequential decision case, see Equation (19b)).
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It is clear from Equation (18) that the firm's optimal net-surplus function consists of three components (see e.g., Celentani and Loveira 2006 for a discussion on three possible explanations for the RPE puzzle). While the last component requires no explanation as it represents the manager's reservation wage at the managerial labor market, the first two components do. The first component depends only on the characteristics of the oligopolistic market (that is, market size A and degree of competition a), but is independent of the characteristics of the firm (that is, the risk factors and the marginal profitability of managerial effort). In contrast, the second component depends only on the firm's characteristics, but is independent of the oligopolistic market's characteristics. Put differently, the first component captures the strategic incentives in the oligopoly, and the second component captures the effort and risk incentives.
16
They actually play two "separate" roles in our model setting, which implies that strategic incentives and risk-sharing incentives are independent of each other. 17 As a consequence, the real issue concerned with the RPE puzzle is why and how, rather than whether or not, RPE is employed in executive pay.
Another insight of Proposition 3 is in its formal theoretical predictions (see Equations (19a) and (19b) for details) about how risk factors affect a firm's net surplus through their effects on the effortincentive rate, which may be further explored by empiricists to perform more powerful tests (Albuquerque 2010, p. 28). First, Equation (19a) states that the higher the common and specific components of risk, the lower the firm's optimal net surplus. Its intuition is as follows: an increase in common risk and/or firm-specific risk will lead to an increase in the risk premium that must be paid to managers, decreasing pay-for-performance sensitivity (see Equation (16a)). The relationship concerned with common risk holds because common risk is inseparable from firm-specific risk (as shown in Proposition 5 in Section 3, this relationship will change when we relax the assumption). 16 The reason why the effort and risk-sharing incentives are inherently together is that managers are assumed to be both effort-and risk-averse and must bear the residual risk (see the discussions following Proposition 1). 17 Specifically, in the model setting of the paper, we assume that: (1) firms in the oligopoly have neither economies nor diseconomies of scope with respect to managers' strategic variable and productive effort (see more discussions in Footnote 6); and (2) the optimal coefficients of the linear compensation contract are simultaneously determined in equilibrium (see more discussions in Footnote 12).
~ 22 ~
Second, (19b) states that shareholders' optimal choice of RPE-related peer groups helps increase the firm's net surplus if, and only if, it helps improve the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the optimal
linear contract. This result suggests that studying the RPE-related peer-group selections is equivalent to examining the impact that the peer groups have on the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the optimal linear compensation contract. In particular, two empirical hypotheses emerge as follows. The first one is that if common risk is more significant than firm-specific risk (i.e., ), the firm's net surplus will be increasing in (see Equation (19b) ). Shareholders would prefer to select as peers those firms whose firm-specific risk is highly positively correlated with their own firm's risk. For instance, Gong, Li, and Shin (2010) observe that "… firms exhibiting a higher ability to remove common risks are more likely to be chosen as peer groups in RPE." The other hypothesis is that if common risk is insignificant relative to firm-specific risk (i.e., / 0), the firm's net surplus will be increasing in the absolute value of .
That is, shareholders would prefer to select as peers those firms whose firm-specific risk is absolutely highly correlated with their own firm's risk. The reason is that the residual risk borne by executives in this case can be approximated by 1 , implying that the larger the absolute value of , the lower the residual risk and in turn the risk premium. In sum, testing these two hypotheses empirically would require that firm industries be partitioned according to their relative ratios of common versus firm-specific risk.
This provides an alternative explanation for the phenomena of "pay for luck" (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001) and "asymmetric benchmarking" in executive pay (Garvey and Milbourn 2006) .
Removing common risk that is separable from firm-specific risks
In this section, we consider that firms compete in Bertrand prices with the demand function
where θ is interpreted as industry demand uncertainty. We assume that θ is normally distributed with mean A and variance 0; thus we simply refer to as the common risk. In addition, we assume that the profit function of Firm i is
~ 23 ~ where Cov θ , ̃ Cov θ , ̃ 0, and Cov ̃ , ̃ . The firm's total risk has two components, i.e., Var . Note that the common risk (first) component is influenced by the strategic variables, while the firm-specific risk (second) component is not. We assume that these risk components are "separable," meaning that managers can personally trade on the industry demand information (θ ) only.
Manager i's compensation contract and end-of-period wealth are given as follows, respectively:
, and
A .
Similar to Equation (4), Manager i's decision problem is characterized by Equations (5a) and (5b). The mean in Equation (23a) and the variance in Equation (23b) of their end-of-period wealth are as follows:
Recall from Equation (5b) 
Solving the above system of equations, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 2: Assume the managers can personally trade on the industry demand information. Then their optimal choices of productive effort, strategic price, and personal investment are as follows (which we denote by ‡): ‡ , (25a) ‡ ∆ 2 1 , and
~ 24 ~ where ∆ ≡ 4 1 1 0.
In Lemma 2, managers' optimal effort and strategic price are identical to those characterized by
Equations (7a) and (7b) of Lemma 1. However, their optimal level of personal investment differs from that in Equation (7c). In particular, the difference is that, while in Equation (7c) depends on the risk factors (including the common risk), ‡ in Equation (25c) is independent of these factors. The intuition is simple. From Equation (24c), it is clear that ‡ . This means that Manager i chooses his personal investment level, ‡ , so as to remove the common risk from the compensation contract for the effort and strategic incentives, given by , that is not already removed by the choice of in the contract for the risk-sharing incentive. Because in the current context common risk is separable from firm-specific risk, managers can entirely remove the common component of risk through their personal investment, which contains no firm-specific risk (unlike the case considered in Section 2).
Substituting the optimal variables in Equations (25a), (25b), and (25c) into the shareholders' problem of designing the optimal linear compensation contract, ≡ , , , , we obtain their netsurplus function as follows:
, and ‡ ≡ 1 2 .
Recall from Equation (12) that ≡ 2 1 , and ≡ 2 1 1 , and from Lemma 1 that ∆ ≡ 4 1 1 . Obviously, these expressions are independent of and , implying that and hence ‡ are independent of and . Note that ‡ is independent of , but is a function of and , while in Equation (11) is independent of and , but is a function of ~ 25 ~ . Accordingly, the first-order conditions of Equation (26) with respect to can be expressed as follows (note that the second-order conditions are negative):
Observe that the first-order conditions in Equations (27a) and (27b) are similar to Equation (A.11)
of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) . Nonetheless, a fundamental difference exists in the nature of the risks: in our paper it is firm-specific risk, while in their paper it is common risk. Because common risk is the focal point of RPE use in executive pay for most empirical studies in both the accounting and financial economics literatures, its absence in the characterization of the non-zero rate for strategic incentives in Equation (27b) represents the main result of our paper.
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Proposition 4: Assume the managers can personally trade on the industry demand information.
(a) It is unnecessary to use RPE in compensation contracts to filter out the common risk that is inherent in the industry demand, i.e., λ ‡ is a free choice (any value would be optimal).
(b) It is always necessary to use RPE in the compensation contracts to provide strategic incentives, and the optimal strategic incentive rate, characterized in Equation (27b), is dependent on the firm-specific risk, and independent of the common risk inherent in the industry demand. Formally, ‡ 0, ‡ 0, and ‡ 0.
(c) The optimal effort incentive rate is characterized as follows:
The rate is independent of the common risk inherent in the industry demand, i.e., ‡ 0.
18 To see that ‡ 0, we only need to verify that Equations (27a) and (27b) cannot be satisfied with ‡ ‡ 0.
~ 26 ~ Proposition 4 shows that, similar to Propositions 1 and 2, when managers can personally trade on an information signal about common risk, it is unnecessary to explicitly use RPE in managers' compensation contracts to filter out the common risk. Further, the optimal strategic incentive rate, ‡ , is independent of common risk, although it is still dependent on firm-specific risk (as it is characterized in Equation (27b); see more discussion following Proposition 6 below). This leads to the main result of the paper: the strategic and risk-sharing incentives of RPE use in managerial performance evaluation in an oligopoly are separate because the risk-sharing incentive of RPE operates on common risks, not firmspecific risks. It is therefore important to distinguish between common risks and firm-specific risks in studying RPE use in executive compensation contracts (Garvey and Milbourn 2003) .
Substituting the optimal linear contract ‡ characterized in Proposition 4 into Equation (26), the firm's optimal net-surplus function in equilibrium can be re-expressed as
The firm's net surplus function above contrasts directly that of Equation (18). In the previous section, where we assume that common risk is inseparable from firm-specific risk, the common risk information is used to remove the common risk inherent in managers' compensation contracts. That is, both the common and the firm-specific risks, which are contracted upon by the use of RPE for strategic interactions in the oligopoly, are removed and hence managers are effectively competing with each other in the product market as if they were risk neutral (that is, in Equation (14) is independent of all risk factors). Moreover, for the same reason that these two types of risks are inseparable, both risks affect the effort incentive (i.e., in Equation (15) is dependent on both and ). Consequently, the firm's net surplus function is decreasing in both common risk and firm-specific risk (see Equation (19a) in Proposition 3). In this section, where we assume that the common risk inherent in the industry demand is separable from firm-specific risk, its information signal can be directly utilized by managers for efficient risk sharing. As a result, the common risk will not affect the firm's net surplus (see Proposition 5 below), ~ 27 ~ though it is brought into the contract by RPE for both strategic and risk-sharing incentives. Further, because the use of RPE for strategic incentives also brings the rival-firm's specific risk into the optimal compensation contract, a risk that the manager must bear, firm-specific risk will continue to affect the manager's strategic choices (as evidenced by the fact that ‡ in Equation (27b) is a function of 2 ).
Proposition 5: Assume the managers can personally trade on the industry demand information. Then, firms' optimal net-surplus function is independent of the common risk inherent in the industry demand. Formally, * * ̃ * * 0.
In the rest of the section, we will examine the shareholders' choice of RPE-related peer group.
Since the analysis of the firm's net-surplus function in Equation (30) with respect to (as a sequential decision through ‡ , ‡ , and ‡ ) is complex, we focus on the simultaneous decision. The objective function of Equation (26) 
Thus, inspecting Equation (27d) together with the first-order condition in Equation (27b) reveals that ‡ 0 and ‡ 0 will be the optimal solution to the shareholders' problem of Equation (26) when shareholders simultaneously determine the use of RPE and its related peer group.
(Recall that is defined in Equation (14) 
Obviously, the firm's net-surplus function is independent of the common risk inherent in the industry demand (the same as Proposition 5 above), and is decreasing in the managers' risk aversion and the firm-specific risk (the same as those in Equation (19a)). The common risk is removed from the ~ 28 ~ optimal linear contract, but the firm-specific risk brought into the contract by the RPE use for strategic interactions is not. Because ‡ brings the rival-firm's profit into the incentive contract and the own-firm's and rival-firms' specific risks are optimally chosen to be correlated as ‡ (which is equal to ‡ ), the residual risk of the optimal contract will be minimized and equal to 1 2 . This explains why the second term of Equation (32) is dependent on the market characteristics of the oligopoly, unlike its counterpart in Equation (18).
Proposition 6: Assume the managers can personally trade on the industry demand information, and the firm's shareholders simultaneously choose the optimal linear contract and the RPE-related peer group. Then, the firm's optimal net surplus is decreasing in the manager's risk aversion and firm-specific risk, but is independent of the common risk inherent in the industry demand. Furthermore, the optimal choice of RPE-related peer groups is equal to the negative strategic-incentive rate, i.e., ‡ .
When shareholders simultaneously determine the use of RPE and its related peer group, the strategic-incentive rate ( ‡ ) is equal to and hence is independent of all risk factors (see Equation (14) of Proposition 1). Then, RPE-related peer group will be optimally chosen so as to "hedge" the own-firm's specific risk against the rival-firm's specific risk brought into the compensation contract by the use of RPE for strategic interactions in an oligopoly. This relationship in Equation (33) supports "a test of the strong-form RPE" employed in empirical models of executive compensation (e.g., Antle and Smith 1986; Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker 1992; Albuquerque 2010) . The residual risk that is born by managers from their optimal linear contracts is minimized.
Concluding remarks
Although both the strategic-interaction and risk-sharing incentives in an oligopoly are salient features of RPE use in executive pay, they respond to two different economic forces (i.e., controllable performance and efficient risk-sharing). Distinguishing explicitly between common risk and firm-specific ~ 29 ~ risks, we show that the strategic-interaction and risk-sharing incentives of RPE are de facto separate objectives. The strategic-interaction incentive, which results from the characteristics of an oligopolistic market, is independent of common risk, the risk with which the risk-sharing incentive of RPE is fundamentally concerned. Consequently, the key insight of our analyses is that the real issue concerned with the RPE puzzle is why and how, rather than whether or not, RPE is employed in executive pay.
Future empirical studies on RPE use in executive pay can benefit from our analyses of this paper.
First, to find the use of RPE for strategic-interaction incentives due to inter-firm interdependencies in an oligopoly, one must clarify and control the nature of the oligopolistic competition (i.e., Bertrand prices versus Cournot quantities) for which the degree of competition in the oligopoly is not a good proxy.
Second, to find the use of RPE for efficient risk-sharing incentives, one must clearly distinguish between common risk and firm-specific risks. Executives' ability to remove the common risk through their personal investments can mitigate such use of RPE in their incentive contracts. Finally, shareholders may optimally choose both RPE use and its related peer groups in compensation contracts simultaneously. As a consequence, the theoretical relationship established in our paper between a firm's equilibrium netsurplus function and shareholders' optimal choices of RPE use and its related peer groups can be further exploited to guide future empirical investigations on RPE.
~ 30 ~
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2:
Note that the manager's personal investment enters the variance in Equation (5d). Thus, setting 0, the variance is given as follows:
As Var affects the risk premium calculation but does not affect in (7a) or in Equation (7b), shareholders' objective function is
That is, the shareholders' objective function in Equation (12) Accordingly, the first-order conditions with respect to ≡ , , , are 
Solving Equation (A5) yields .
~ 31 ~ Substituting Equations (A6) into (A3) and solving for yields . Note that 0 due to Equation (A6); thus, Equation (A4) is equivalent to Equation (13b), which implies that . Finally, substituting Equations (14) and (15) back into Equation (A6) yields Equation (17).
Q.E.D.
